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José Ricardo Tauile* 
The objective of this work is to evaluate the results of 
the principal investigations conducted in recent 
years on the socio-economic implications of 
microelectronics-based automation in Brazil, and in 
particular the investigations carried out by the 
author himself. 
These investigations focussed on the quantita-
tive and qualitative impact produced on labour and 
on patterns of accumulation by the dissemination of 
microelectronics-automated equipment in Brazil; 
the link between external restrictions, automation 
and employment; the relationship between micro-
electronic automation and competitiveness; and 
lastly, an evaluation of the main socio-economic 
questions inherent in the dissemination of the 
microelectronic technical base in Brazil. 
A very brief section describes some of the 
technological-industrial and labour conditions exist-
ing in Brazil prior to the more intensive dissemina-
tion of the new technical base in the early 1980s. The 
next section characterizes this decade as particularly 
important for the Brazilian economy and presents 
some dimensions of the crisis, the levels of dissemi-
nation of microelectronics-automated equipment, 
the volume of employment related to them and the 
sources of competitiveness that led to a sudden 
increase in the export of products of local industry. 
The three subsequent sections give a more detailed 
but brief analysis of three complexes: first, textiles, 
clothing and footwear; second, metal-mechanical 
work; and third, electronics. In the last section we 
raise two fundamental problems to define the direc-
tions in which the Brazilian economy is to develop 
during the coming decades: the updating of capital-
labour relations and the integration of industrial and 
technological policies. 
•Professor at the University of Rio de Janeiro. This 
text is part of the report O mercado de Irabalho brasiletro -
estrulura e conjuntura ("The Brazilian labour market -
structure and economic situation"), prepared for the 
Brazilian Ministry of Labour. 
Introduction 
Brazil entered the 1980s with an industrial base 
of large proportions and with a reasonable 
degree of complementarity in the production 
system, from consumer goods for workers to 
sophisticated producer goods used for producing 
other capital goods. For at least three decades, 
using essentially electromechanical techniques, 
Brazilian industrialization was reflected in high 
rates of economic growth, averaging about 7% 
per year. Throughout this period, growing 
numbers of workers were incorporated into the 
capitalist production system, becoming consu-
mers. In spite of this, income distribution grew 
worse, to the advantage of a population class 
which became smaller and smaller in numbers 
and more and more wealthy. 
Social relationships in the production sphere 
followed two basic paths. On the one hand, the 
physical organization and the methods of pro-
duction were reflected in the theories of Ford 
and Taylor, although it was still necessary to 
make many adaptations because of local 
characteristics. 
Thus the constant improvisations necessi-
tated by technical change implied a fairly versa-
tile labour force that could enable a previously 
existing quasi-handicraft-agricultural technical 
base to coexist with an electromechanical base 
that was being established. In these terms, 
highly skilled workers created concrete possibili-
ties for the installation and functioning of a 
manufacturing base which is already one of the 
eight largest in the world. 
On the other hand, capital-labour relations 
in Brazil were formalized by the law, under 
strong co-operativist influence, when the coun-
try began to pass through the first convulsions of 
the replacement of industrial-goods imports 
during the 1930s. The changes in labour legisla-
tion up to the present decade tended in general 
to favour the populist and/or authoritarian 
interests of the governments. In essence, under 
these conditions, the creation and growth of an 
industrial labour force were not accompanied by 
an adjustment of labour problems to the func-
tioning of an industrial economy that was only 
minimally developed. So-called "white unio-
nism" was the norm and not the exception; in 
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addition to this, the long period of continued 
industrial expansion concealed a series of ques-
tions inherent in the dynamics of a modern capi-
talist economy. A clear example of the foregoing 
¡s the fact that problems characteristic of a 
The decade of the 1980s is significant for the 
Brazilian economy because of at least three fac-
tors. At the beginning of the decade there was a 
severe economic crisis which, for the first time, 
caused high levels of industrial unemployment 
in the country. A typical example was the 30% 
drop in the production of motor vehicles 
between 1980 and 1981, which resulted in the 
unemployment of 25 % of the labour force in this 
leading industry. Another characteristic of the 
evolution of this crisis was the high degree of 
external indebtedness that developed, with the 
result that the economy came to be oriented 
more towards exports in order to obtain foreign 
currency. Using exports as a way out was also 
more or less "natural" for many of the enter-
prises that saw the utilization of their productive 
capacity decline suddenly with the withdrawal of 
domestic demand. In actuality, this withdrawal 
immediately created a need to increase the effi-
ciency of these enterprises. Thus, merely as a 
matter of survival, they were forced to reduce the 
amounts needlessly spent on fixed capital, circu-
lating capital and personnel, to improve the pro-
ductivity of these factors and to seek new 
markets for their activities. Many did so by 
means of exports, which in turn required an 
improvement of competitive capacity, either 
through an appropriate cost structure, through a 
pattern of quality indispensable to certain 
markets, or through the capacity to deliver goods 
on time within agreed time-limits. 
This means that while foreign-exchange 
policies were decisive, on the one hand, in mak-
ing a number of manufactured products compet-
i t ive d u r i n g c e r t a i n p e r i o d s , th i s 
competitiveness also arises from the specific 
mature industrial economy, such as technologi-
cal unemployment, possibly associated with the 
process of modernization, never arose because 
the economy and employment were expanding 
so rapidly. 
comparative advantages of the various industrial 
complexes that existed in the Brazilian economy 
(Erber, F., Araujo Jr., J. T., and Tauile, J. R. 
1985). Thus, the iron and steel industry, the 
petrochemical industry and the cellulose-and-
paper industry, all of which sell intermediate 
products and whose production is organized bas-
ically in the form of continuous flow (in other 
words, with low labour-intensity), are favoured 
by the "technical age of productive capacity". 
They benefit "especially from the modernity of 
the installations constructed in the recent past" 
(ibid.), as well as from the availability and low 
prices of local inputs (and obviously also of the 
minimal production scales already attained 
locally). 
The products of the textile/clothing/foot-
wear complex derive their competitiveness 
chiefly from the relative cost of local resources. 
"Intensive use is being made of relatively abund-
ant natural resources (for example, fibres and 
hides)" and especially "relatively cheap man-
power" (ibid.). 
There are also a number of manufactured 
products (requiring a reasonable amount of tech-
nological processing) within the metal-
mechanical complex, such as producer goods, 
weapons and durable consumer goods, which, in 
addition to requiring sufficient technological 
skill —something that already existed in the 
country— satisfactorily meet the demand of spe-
cific markets sufficiently akin or similar to the 
characteristics of Brazilian markets. In this con-
text, a substantial share of such exports is 
intended for "trade between peers", with coun-
tries whose degree of development is close to or 
lower than that of Brazil, although it also 
I 
The introduction of microelectronics-automated equipment 
(MAE) in Brazil and the question of competitiveness 
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extends to market niches in the so-called deve-
loped countries of the North, as evidenced by the 
export of aircraft and of automobiles and auto 
parts to those countries {ibid.). 
The second outstanding factor for this analy-
sis relates to the increase in the levels of dissemi-
nation of microelectronics-automated 
equipment (MAE). In general, a policy for the 
local and national development of production 
training in the field of electronic data-processing 
equipment (EDP) began in the 1970s, on the 
basis of an implicit "alliance" between segments 
of the armed forces (especially the navy) and 
Brazilian intellectual élites with technical train-
ing, engaged in professional activities, particu-
larly in information science. The generally 
accepted view of this movement was that Brazil 
was facing a strategic problem that involved 
national security, in various aspects (military, 
economic, social and the like). Convinced of this 
perception, at the end of the decade the military 
government created a Special Secretariat for 
Information Science (SSIS) [Secretaría Especial 
de Informática (SEI)] at the ministerial level in 
order to formulate and carry out policies for this 
sector. 
With regard to MAE, implementation of the 
policy formulated by SSIS began during the 
1980s, pursuing the successive objectives of tech-
nological and industrial training for the produc-
tion of digital control boxes (DCs), logically 
programmable controllers (PCs), computer-
assisted design installations (CADs) and indus-
trial robots. This policy has been based on the 
purchase or initial licensing of technology by 
Brazilian enterprises which would later make a 
concentrated effort to absorb it in a relatively 
short period (four to five years) and develop it, 
thus creating national skills. It is not yet possible 
to make a convincing analysis of the results of 
this policy. Actually, some skills are being 
created, since at least 90% or so of the digitally 
controlled machine tools (DCMTs) and almost 
all the PCs put into operation in 1985 had been 
manufactured in the country. However, such 
equipment is still very expensive in comparison 
with foreign equipment of the same kind. It is 
argued that this is due to inadequacy of scale and 
to the high cost of materials and components, 
but the lack of competitiveness in a protected 
market may be responsible for a significant por-
tion of this difference in price. 
The rates of dissemination of DCMTs and 
PCs remained stable during the early part of the 
1980s. This was followed by a movement that 
included two opposing trends. On the one hand, 
financial difficulties inhibited investment in new 
equipment, while on the other hand, the search 
for greater productivity stimulated it. In any 
case, beginning in 1983-1984, with the recovery 
of growth, the dissemination rates increased 
(including CADs and robots) and caused a pro-
gressive and intensive utilization of local pro-
ductive capacity. The amount of installed MAE in 
1985 was estimated at 1 600 DCMTs, 1 600 PCs, 
70 large-capacity CADs and 20 industrial robots 
(Tauile, 1986a). 
More recent data obtained from the Brazi-
lian Society for Digital Control and Industrial 
Automation (Sociedade Brasileira de Comando 
Numérico e Automataçao Industrial -
SOBRACON) show that in 1987 Brazilian manu-
facturers sold 1 018 DCMTs (worth about 
US$200 million) on the domestic market, bring-
ing the inventory of this type of equipment up to 
2 928 units {Boletim SOBRACON, Vol. IV, No. 
37/38,1988). This source indicates that 71 large 
graphical computation systems (CAD/CAM) and 
540 small ones, based on microcomputers, were 
sold in 1987. Sales amounted to approximately 
US$8.2 million and US$20.8 million respec-
tively, and installed equipment in that year 
included 190 large units and 732 small units. In 
the area of robots, 18 units, with a total value of 
US$45.1 million, were sold in 1987, raising the 
existing inventory to 87 installed units. As for 
logically programmable controllers, notwith-
standing the difficulty of recording a large var-
iety of models and applications, SOBRACON 
estimates that invoiced sales amounted to US$32 
million. 
The increase in the levels of dissemination 
of MAE also means that a larger number of 
workers are carrying on their activities by using 
the microelectronic technical base. In 1985 
approximately 220 000 workers were employed 
on various microelectronic data-processing units 
(Tauile, 1986a). In the light of the accelerated 
dissémination of such units from that time on, it 
may be estimated that the number of workers 
associated with this field is now over 300 000. 
This brings us to the third fundamental axis of 
the analysis: it is becoming increasingly urgent 
to improve capital-labour relations in Brazil, 
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with the appropriate institutional approval. The 
opportunity is almost unique, or at least particu-
larly favourable for this, owing to the process of 
liberalization and democratization of the politi-
cal reegime and of the present installation of a 
National Constituent Assembly. However, 
1. The textile/clothing/footwear complex 
In this complex the dissemination of MAE is still 
very low and is not essential, in the short term, 
for guaranteeing the current pattern of competi-
tiveness of enterprises, in relation either to the 
domestic market or to the foreign market. In the 
latter case, as mentioned before, competitive-
ness derives from the availability and low cost of 
these factors, particularly manpower, and on the 
other hand, the dissemination of MAE in this 
complex is still limited at the international level; 
there is no expectation that relevant structural 
modifications will come in the short term as a 
result of some spectacular technological advance. 
a) The textile sector 
In the case of the textile sector, the use of 
microelectronic devices does not radically 
change the organization of production. All it 
does is accentuate the already existing tendency, 
even in the electromechanical base, to assimilate 
it to a continuous flow of production. Owing to 
the diversity of the demand structure, the corres-
ponding production base is also fairly hetero-
geneous, and the enterprises which cater to the 
foreign market are in general the ones with a 
concentration of more modern and advanced 
equipment. However, the use of such equipment 
is not yet being considered for the exports of this 
sector. Actually, as a result of the crisis of the 
early 1980s, and stimulated basically by currency 
policies, many enterprises have succeeded in 
penetrating the foreign market, so that exports 
before analysing this aspect, we shall give an 
overview of the process of dissemination of MAE 
in terms of some of the fields in which it is 
utilized and the respective factors which stimu-
late or retard the dissemination of this type of 
equipment in Brazil. 
in 1985 were up to US$1 billion, which repres-
ents 30% of the sector's output (Tauile, 1986b). 
The main reasons that motivate entrepre-
neurs in this sector to introduce 
microelectronics-based automation are: higher 
quality required to compete in foreign markets, 
greater control over the production process and 
greater competitiveness. Among the obstacles 
are: the high cost of automated equipment, the 
difficulties of importing it, low wages and the 
ability to compete in the domestic market with 
less sophisticated equipment (ibid.). 
b) Clothing 
With regard to the ready-to-wear clothing 
sector, as in the preceding case, the profile of 
domestic demand is fairly heterogeneous, 
although this has already been catered to by an 
extensive production structure which includes 
countless microenterprises and small enter-
prises. The exports of the sector were slightly 
less than 1% of the total amount of manufac-
tured goods exported in 1984. 
In any case, even on the international scene, 
the degree of integration between the various 
steps of the production process is low, the utili-
zation of manpower is still intensive, and no 
rapid dissemination of MAE is foreseen; it tends 
to be concentrated in the area of production 
management and in the optimization of fabric-
cutting (Tauile, 1986c). In the Brazilian case, 
savings on manpower, which —as mentioned 
before— is very cheap, do not constitute a 
strong incentive, although savings on materials 
II 
The dynamics of dissemination through 
industrial complexes 
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may be significant. This also means that the 
reasonably simple CADs used for the optimiza-
tion of cutting may be supplied perfectly well by 
local industry. 
Among the factors that stimulate the utiliza-
tion of MAE in the sector are: simplification of 
the initial tasks of the production process, sav-
ings on materials, savings on skilled labour for 
preparation, better quality of the final product 
and creative flexibility for launching new mod-
els, in addition, naturally, to efforts aimed at an 
increase in competitiveness and the recovery of 
the economy. 
With regard to the factors that discourage 
the introduction of MAE, in addition to the 
recent economic crisis, which caused a general 
postponement of investments for the expansion 
of productive capacity, we should mention: the 
low cost of manpower, the high cost of the MAE, 
the cost of training the operators and the diffi-
culties in maintenance (Tauile, 1986b). 
Lastly, entrepreneurs argue that both in the 
clothing sector and in the textile sector, the lack 
of a well-defined technological policy has 
retarded the process of dissemination of MAE. 
c) Footwear 
The manufacture of footwear also makes 
intensive use of manpower (it employs 3.2% of 
the labour force in the processing industry, but it 
represents only 1.5% of the aggregate value). 
The great majority of the industry consists of 
microenterprises and small enterprises, with a 
total of more than 4 500 firms. Of this total, 
however, scarcely more than 300 are exporters, 
although they account for a relatively high share 
in comparison with the rest. The foreign market 
has grown in importance for this sector, which is 
already responsible for more than 7% of the 
exports of manufactured goods. More than 25% 
of the sector's output is exported, and over 80% 
of this amount is sent to the United States. On 
the other hand, it should be noted that the pro-
ducers do not control the export channels (ibid.). 
In technological terms, it may be said that in 
the manufacture of footwear "hand-made" is a 
synonym for high quality, and this is contrary to 
one of the main grounds cited for the use of 
automated equipment. The Brazilian footwear 
industry has incorporated few of the most recent 
microelectronics-based technological innova-
tions, of which there are not many in any case. 
Even with regard to automated design for the 
modelling and development of products, there 
are no indications of any significant dissemina-
tion in Brazil. Some of the possible stimuli for 
automation would be: precision, flexibility of the 
production line and reduction of leather-cutting 
costs (flexibility is the most important stimulus 
in Brazil at present). 
Among the discouraging factors, the most 
important is the irregular nature of leather, as a 
result of which cutting by hand is still indispen-
sable. Moreover, in this sector too, the low cost 
of manpower, the small scale of the producing 
units and the low degree of specialization are 
important factors which retard the dissemina-
tion of MAE. It should be mentioned here that 
entrepreneurs in this sector take little interest in 
the possible importance of microelectronics-
based automation for the success of their 
business. 
2. The metal-mechanical complex 
The dissemination of MAE through the metal-
mechanical complex has contours which are bet-
ter defined, both internationally and in Brazil. It 
has already reached higher levels and is of much 
greater importance than in the textile/clothing/ 
footwear complex. In the sectors of the metal-
mechanical complex the limits of automation 
traditionally established by electromechanical 
devices were overcome by the development and 
introduction of MAE (Tauile, 1986a). The con-
sequences, both at the product level (quality and 
diversification) and at the level of organization 
of production (profile and volume of employ-
ment, control of the process, etc.) and at the level 
of cost structure (economies of scale, productiv-
ity, etc.) significantly altered the patterns of 
competition, mainly in the international sphere, 
where new microelectronic techniques are 
already more widely disseminated. The follow-
ing sectors, although they belong to the same 
complex, have very different characteristics, 
both with regard to the structure of ownership 
or demand and with regard to the scale and 
organization of production. 
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a) Machine tools 
The manufacture of machine tools has been 
affected to a considerable extent by the dissemi-
nation of the new technical base. To begin with, 
the machine-tool sector itself, in addition to 
being the producer of MAE, is also one of its 
principal users. In Brazil this sector had reached 
a level of internationally recognized competi-
tiveness in the 1970s on the basis of electrome-
chanical equipment, most of which was owned 
by Brazilian private capital. Of the 102 locally 
established enterprises in 1975,18 were foreign 
subsidiaries, and half of these were German. 
Several of them had been recently installed as a 
result of the stimuli of the Second National 
Development Plan, which was intended to con-
solidate the formation of a capital-goods sector 
in Brazil. Although the foreign enterprises were 
not the largest ones, they specialized in the pro-
duction of more advanced and more complex 
equipment, and this remains true to the present 
day. Nine subsidiaries of German enterprises are 
responsible for about 60% of the production of 
DCMTs (Stemmer, 1985), which in 1987 had 
reached the level of 800 units produced per year. 
Even though the portfolio of machine-tool 
orders has been systematically kept full, so that 
the sector could grow substantially and make 
new investments in equipment (in addition, as 
has been mentioned, to being the sector which 
made extensive use of DCMTs), prices remain 
significantly high: they were two or three times 
as high as those of similar equipment sold on the 
international market (even the equipment made 
by the German subsidiaries' parent companies). 
This is curious, since the alleged reasons of high 
material and component costs and small-scale 
production cannot cancel the savings derived 
from the use of cheap labour. It is useful to 
remember that this type of production makes 
intensive use of skilled labour, which is fairly 
easy to find locally. 
In the face of import difficulties, it is worth 
mentioning that the high prices of locally pro-
duced MAE continue to be the greatest obstacle 
to its dissemination in Brazil. On the other hand, 
the rapidity of the dissemination creates a rela-
tive but transitory shortage of skilled labour to 
operate, maintain and program them. 
The principal stimuli for making the sector 
adopt MAE are related to the guarantee of preci-
sion (and of quality) afforded by the complex 
units used for production and by the economies 
of scale, that is to say, the flexibility of rapidly 
reconvertible equipment, which is very impor-
tant in small-scale production. 
Machine-tool producers have made efficient 
use of their MAE, sometimes even using experi-
ments with group technologies, automated cells, 
etc., which produces a sort of technological con-
vergence and apprenticeship in economies of 
scale (even though there is no complete flexible 
manufacturing system now installed in Brazil, 
nor are there any plans to install one). 
Three other facts with regard to this sector 
should be mentioned here. In the first place, 
there is a shortage of simpler and cheaper MAE, 
to meet the demand from many small and 
medium-sized enterprises and enable them to 
take advantage, at least partially, of the skills of 
the existing labour force (Tauile, 1984a). 
In the second place, the international com-
petitiveness of the sector has been severely 
shaken, either because MAE has taken conven-
tional (electromechanical) machine tools out of 
the market and local industry has not yet man-
aged to reconvert efficiently or because the prin-
cipal purchasers (which are also developing 
countries, such as Mexico) were badly hurt by the 
crisis of the early 1980s. In fact the exports of the 
sector during the first half of this decade were 
reduced to barely one quarter of the 1980 level 
and show no signs of recovery. 
Lastly, there is some fear that the change in 
the technical base may stimulate the process of 
centralization of the industry, to the benefit of 
the most capable and financially solid enter-
prises and of those which are the most dynamic 
technologically. This process would favour large 
enterprises and the subsidiaries of foreign enter-
prises. Moreover, this problem is not limited to 
the manufacture of machine tools; as the nucleus 
of a technological convergence, it radiates into 
problems similarly encountered in the rest of the 
economy (ibid.). 
b) The automotive industry 
The automotive industry is led by four major 
transnational assembly enterprises which prac-
tically dominate the entire automobile market in 
Brazil. There are three other large assembly 
NOTES ON MICROELECTRONIC AUTOMATION IN BRAZIL / J.R. Tauile 55 
enterprises of European origin which specialize 
in the production of commercial vehicles (buses, 
trucks, etc.). In the automobile-parts sector, par-
ticipation by Brazilian private capital now con-
stitutes the majority, even though some of the 
major enterprises are subsidiaries of important 
transnational firms. 
In 1980 the industry produced almost 1.2 
million vehicles, which indicates a reasonable 
degree of industrial maturity. However, both the 
models offered and the methods used to produce 
them were still lagging substantially behind the 
internationally prevailing patterns. The sharp 
drop in production during the following year 
forced the assembly enterprises to redefine their 
strategies in order to guarantee better and more 
effective utilization of their productive capacity. 
The choice generally made was to produce mod-
els similar to those produced in the developed 
countries, so that they could also be exported, 
thereby creating a flexibility that would enable 
the enterprises to reduce the under-utilization of 
their installations (Tauile, 1984b). 
It can be said that from that time on, the 
Brazilian automotive industry entered a new 
phase of its development, a phase of greater 
integration into international industry. By 1981, 
exports had doubled, reaching almost 27% of 
total production, and thereafter they decreased 
slightly, although never to less than one fifth of 
total production. From 1982 to 1983, General 
Motors and Ford launched their "world cars", in 
which they were followed in 1984 by FIAT and 
VW (which does not agree that "world car" is a 
novel concept and had in fact been producing 
more up-to-date models since 1980). 
The production of the new models was 
accompanied by the introduction of new produc-
tion lines and MAE such as: robots, DCMTs, 
flexible transfer-machine systems, flexible mul-
tiple welding systems, magnetic-car transport 
systems, air transport systems, automated sys-
tems for final tests of vehicles, real-time control 
systems for production flows and the flows of 
intermediate inventories, etc. In actuality, a 
development as important as or more important 
than the introduction of these types of MAE was 
the generalized effort to make production more 
efficient, avoiding waste and reducing the for-
mation of inventories, through the introduction 
of adapted forms of "just-in-time" (or "kan-
ban") systems. This search for efficiency and 
modernization affected both assembly enter-
prises and suppliers of automobile parts, and it 
certainly resulted in production patterns (qual-
ity, capacity for on-time delivery, cost, etc.) 
which were closer to the international patterns 
for this industry {ibid.). 
Although Brazil still does not have a mass 
dissemination of MAE that can measure up to 
the levels of developed countries, the level is 
already becoming significant in relation to Brazi-
lian patterns. Assembly plants were pioneers in 
the use of robots. DCMTs are coming to be more 
widely used by the tool-making shops of assem-
bly plants and by the producers of auto parts, 
chiefly for trucks (small scale) and/or for the 
foreign market, and programmable controllers 
are being put to the most diverse kinds of use on 
the production lines of both sectors {ibid.). 
In any case, all the assembly plants recognize 
that this is a phase of apprenticeship in the new 
technical base, so that MAE may be even more 
intensively and efficiently used in future produc-
tion lines manufacturing new models. The main 
incentives for its utilization involve guarantees 
of quality, greater control of the production pro-
cess and greater flexibility of the production 
lines. The main disincentives are the low cost of 
the labour that can be replaced by automated 
equipment (by robots, for example), the high 
cost of such equipment, and the productivity of 
such equipment and of the production lines pre-
viously in operation. 
c) The aircraft sector 
In the aircraft industry the main Brazilian 
enterprise (a State enterprise) has no need, in 
terms of quality of products and up-to-date sta-
tus of production processes, to envy other enter-
prises in the world that operate in the same 
market sector. EMBRAER has been using 
DCMTs since the first half of the 1970s and has 
been using automated design since the begin-
ning of the 1980s. 
Fundamentally the MAE in this industry is 
justified by the absolute requirement for preci-
sion and high quality that must be satisfied by 
anyone who wants to sell aircraft (chiefly on the 
international market), by the small scales of pro-
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duction and by the flexibility required of the 
equipment. Owing to the characteristics of the 
necessary production techniques and to the fact 
that it is State-owned, this enterprise initially 
enjoyed special facilities for importing foreign 
equipment, thus staying close to the interna-
tional state of the art. 
Among other factors making for the techno-
logical success of EMBRAER are: strong military 
(air force) support, the proximity and integrated 
support of the Research and Development Insti-
tute of the Technological Centre for Aeronautics 
(Instituto de Investigaçoes e Desenvolvimento 
do Centro Tecnológico de Aeronáutica) and the 
training of engineers by the Aeronautical Insti-
tute of Technology {Instituto Tecnológico de 
Aeronáutica). Lastly, it should be mentioned that 
the market was protected by a prohibition on the 
import of any aircraft similar to those produced 
by EMBRAER. 
EMBRAER has collaborated closely with Ital-
ian companies, obtaining technological licenses 
or participating in joint projects (as in the case of 
the AMX. Until recently almost all the avionics 
components of its aircraft were imported. The 
policy of nationalizing its production has stimu-
lated the granting of licences by Italian 
enterprises. 
3. The electrical-electronic complex 
MAE has not yet been utilized to any significant 
extent in the production of computers and tele-
communications equipment (the electronic com-
plex), chiefly because of the lack of large-scale 
production. 
a) Computers 
In recent years the Brazilian computer 
industry has grown, been nationalized and 
become deconcentrated. From 1973 to 1985, 
Brazilian enterprises, which accounted for 23% 
of the market, grew in geometric progression at 
an average rate of 59% per year (as opposed to 
7% for the multinationals) until they possessed 
more than 50% of a market estimated at US$2 
billion and employing more than 30 000 
workers (more than one-third of whom are 
highly skilled). The five largest enterprises, 
which had controlled 88% of the market in 1974, 
were reduced to 46% in 1984. 
In terms of technological updating, the pro-
ducts are not too far behind international patt-
erns. In 1984 the lag of the microcomputers 
produced in Brazil was approximately one year, 
but it was longer for minicomputers and peri-
pheral equipment (Tigre and Periné, 1984). 
This performance, which actually was not main-
tained at the same level, is attributable to the 
high technological skill of some national enter-
prises and to the fact that the main components 
can be acquired on the international market. 
Production processes are falling further 
behind the state of the art. The levels of automa-
tion are low; in general, production costs are 
high in comparison with those of other recently 
industrialized countries, a fact reflected in the 
poor performance of the export sector. In 1984, 
exports amounted to US$150 million, of which 
IBM represents about 80% (Tauile, 1986b). 
As a result of the process of import substitu-
tion, which made the birth of the Brazilian com-
puter industry possible, the capacity to design or 
adapt computers developed without any similar 
concern with production processes. Thus the 
market had a great diversity of models whose 
production was relatively small-scale and conse-
quently could not be automated. On the other 
hand, the high costs did not represent any great 
problem, since they were passed on to the consu-
mers, in the light of the fact that the market was 
protected from foreign competition and demand 
was only small. 
As the industry develops, this picture is 
tending to become modified. Competition is 
growing with the entry of new firms which are 
contending for the growing market, and thus 
there is greater concern about the production 
process in general and about costs in particular. 
The increase in scale has not yet been reflected in 
the patterns of automation, chiefly because 
labour is very cheap. Indeed, priority for the use 
of MAE is justified not in terms of costs but in 
terms of improved quality, and above all in the 
advancement of design capacity. Thus a recent 
investigation showed that MAE is being gradu-
ally introduced into the areas of design, quality 
control and assembly (Hewitt, 1986). In the light 
of the lack of large-scale production, the costs of 
introducing MAE into the production of compu-
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ters in Brazil are becoming prohibitive. Sim-
ilarly, its introduction at the present time 
represents a high-risk investment because of the 
rapid obsolescence of present-day technology. 
Despite the differences with regard to the 
history of its establishment and development, as 
well as the characteristics of the present indus-
trial structure, the production of telecommunica-
tions equipment in Brazil is troubled by the same 
problems as the production of computers with 
regard to the introduction of MAE. 
b) Telecommunications equipment 
The telecommunications-equipment indus-
try entered a new phase in 1974, when the 
government began to stimulate the develop-
ment of a national segment of the industry and 
when microelectronics-based digital technology 
began to be adopted as a pattern. The principal 
instrument of policy was the monopsonistic 
power of the State, which was the principal 
purchaser of telecommunications equipment 
and which required its suppliers to prove that at 
least 50% of their circulating capital was 
Brazilian-owned. The main foreign enterprises 
In conclusion, it is important to mention two 
points. The first relates to the updating of 
capital-labour relations in Brazil, and the second 
to the intégration of industrial and technological 
policies. 
The existing lag between a reasonably deve-
loped economy which is beginning to work with 
the microelectronics base and a labour legisla-
tion which goes back to the origins of import 
substitution in Brazil should be reduced, if not 
eliminated. In actuality, this is not so much a lag 
as a distortion provoked by rapid and continuous 
economic growth and a succession of populist or 
authoritarian governments which inhibited and 
repressed trade-union movements capable of 
genuine adaptation to the new production base 
that was being established. 
in the sector "nationalized" their capital, becom-
ing associated with large international groups in 
Brazil. A large number of telecommunications-
equ ipment un i t s , d igi ta l ized a n d / o r 
microelectronics-based, were developed and 
produced since that time by the industry, in tech-
nological patterns not very different from the 
international ones. The fact that there existed a 
reserve of the market for computers, and that 
there was a technological convergence with com-
puters facilitated the development of an authen-
tically Brazilian segment in this industry. 
In spite of all this, there is still an apprecia-
ble degree of technological dependency, and both 
in costs and in quality the lag behind the interna-
tional state of the art is considerable. As menti-
oned earlier, the problems are basically the same 
as those faced in the production of computers. 
The lack of large-scale production and the 
low cost of manpower are the principal obstacles 
to automation based on MAE, which should 
come gradually in the areas of design, quality 
control (testing) and assembly, in order that 
Brazil's telecommunications industry may 
become more competitive internationally 
(Tauile, 1986b). 
In addition to higher levels of capital produc-
tivity resulting from industrialization, this also 
guaranteed even greater returns through the 
simple relative devaluation of work, In fact the 
electromechanical technical base that had been 
established with the industrialization of Brazil is 
incomparably more productive from the capital-
ist point of view than the quasi-handicraft base 
that had existed in the past. Moreover, much of 
the equipment installed by multinational enter-
prises had already been depreciated in its coun-
tries of origin and was being "revived" for a new 
accumulation cycle. The rates of profit related to 
their new utilization were thus potentiated, in 
view of the fact that in the numerator the fixed 
constant capital, referring to equipment, had 
been reduced almost to zero. 
Ill 
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Lastly, the failure to improve labour legisla-
tion, as well as the incentive for corruption in the 
trade-union movement (in addition to wage 
reductions, etc.), represented in practice a reduc-
tion of the cost of social reproduction of the 
labour force, and therefore a new increase in the 
rate of research, which in turn increases even 
further the rates of profit prevailing with the 
new production pattern. 
During the past 10 years the Brazilian trade-
union movement has been rediscovering its 
identity. Initially there was absolutely no con-
cern about technological factors, in view of the 
immensity of the other problems confronting 
workers in Brazil. Nevertheless, during the past 
five years, as MAE came to be more widely used, 
the principal trade unions have become more 
aware of the undesirable effects of the new wave 
of automation. It is interesting to note that the 
unions have never opposed the process of 
microelectronics-based automation, but they 
naturally want to safeguard their rights and gua-
rantee for themselves a suitable share of the 
production gains made. 
Entrepreneurs and production managers 
who are experimenting with equipment using 
the new technical base are coming to realize that 
they must be able to count on a more reliable, and 
therefore more stable, labour force. This would 
seem to mean that there is a way to negotiate 
new capital-labour relations in Brazil. It is not 
clear how much progress can be made within 
this context, chiefly because much of the industry 
is still developing in the traditional way and is 
being led by entrepreneurs with a conservative 
mentality and faults rooted in the long period of 
authoritarian rule which the country underwent 
recently. What is beyond question is the urgent 
need to make sure that the technological evolu-
tion of the production apparatus is based on 
improved and more compatible social 
relationships. 
For all these reasons, it would be desirable 
that the democratic ideals expressed by the Braz-
ilian people when it elected a constituent assem-
bly should also be given tangible expression in a 
minimum body of laws to protect workers from 
the undesirable effects of the process of techno-
logical modernization, which will not be an 
undesirable process for them if it also brings 
effects that are in their favour. Moreover, this is 
obviously fair: if Brazil is using equipment which 
is already standard in the so-called developed 
countries, the existing labour laws should also be 
reformed to make them at least similar to the 
laws in force in those countries. 
The second conclusion to be drawn relates to 
the integration of industrial and technological 
policies, in an attempt to maintain (and, if possi-
ble, to improve) the competitive capacity of 
Brazilian industry and also to promote a policy of 
effective technological training in the country, 
with a view to long-term economic and social 
development. 
In actuality, the technological jumps pro-
duced by factors extraneous to the dynamics of 
the local economy should be avoided for the 
present, at least until labour legislation is 
brought up to date, so as to avoid creating distor-
tions even greater than those mentioned. On the 
other hand, if the trend towards redemocratiza-
tion of the country prevails, it is to be hoped that 
there will be a social appreciation of local labour, 
and consequently a gradual increase in real 
wages. Enterprises will probably try even harder 
to make their production processes more effi-
cient and more modern. This means that there 
will be a continued incentive for the dissemina-
tion of MAE, since it is essentially through 
increased productivity that enterprises will be 
able to maintain their profitability. 
This continuous increase in demand can be 
met in large measure by the local production 
structure, provided that there is sufficient incen-
tive to make the necessary investments in 
research and development, in increased produc-
tion capacity and, over the long term, even in the 
import of producer goods or particularly stra-
tegic production methods for the ordered devel-
opment of the industry. What must be avoided is 
a situation in which the industrial sectors thus 
encouraged (principally enterprises of foreign 
origin) enjoy the benefits of an oligopoly as a 
result of the fact that protection of the market 
does not fulfil its objectives. In other words, after 
a period of implantation, production in the lead-
ing industrial sectors should be, if not at the 
advanced level of the international state of the 
art, at least within the range of costs that are 
compatible with those prevailing on the interna-
tional scene. In the case of MAE there is no 
justification for incompatibility. 
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It would thus be possible to avoid excessive 
and unnecessary acceleration of Brazilian indus-
try's competitive capacity, and an effort would be 
made to ensure the necessary preservation of the 
capacity to produce and to design the equipment 
using the new technical base, particularly if 
account is taken of the long term, when such 
goods will no longer be the vanguard and will 
become the standard of technology, and beyond 
this, when the producer goods of today become 
the durable consumer goods of tomorrow. What 
would be happening would be the formation of a 
professional culture appropriate to a modern, 
democratic, social-welfare country. The strategy 
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